Court Decisions
The Northeast
Dairy Compact Commission has been a party in three lawsuits testing the
constitutionality and implementation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy
Compact. In two of the cases, the Commission was a defendant; in the third,
the Commission is a plaintiff.
In the first
case, Milk
Industry Foundation v. Glickman, the national trade association representing
the interests of milk processors filed a lawsuit in federal district court
in Washington, D.C., challenging the constitutionality of the Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact as well as the administrative propriety of the
Secretary of Agriculture’s finding of a "compelling public interest" in
the New England region. (By Congressional condition of consent to the Compact,
the Secretary’s finding was a condition precedent to implementation of
the Compact.) The Commission intervened as a defendant in this action.
The federal district court first denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, and later, granted the Secretary’s and the Commission’s motions
for summary judgment, concluding that the Compact was constitutional and
that the Secretary’s "compelling public interest" finding satisfied the
requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs subsequently
appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. On January 20, 1998, the appellate
court affirmed the district court’s decision. Although MIF had the
option to seek either rehearing before the appellate court or discretionary
review from the United States Supreme Court, it requested neither form
of review. Accordingly, the MIF litigation has now been concluded, and
the constitutionality of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact has been
upheld.
In the second
case, the Commission and its executive director, Daniel Smith, were named
as defendants in New
York State Dairy Foods, Inc. et al. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Commission
et al., a lawsuit brought in federal district court in Boston, MA.
The primary plaintiffs in this litigation were non-New England milk processors
who challenged the scope of the Commission’s authority to regulate milk
that is produced and processed outside the region but distributed in the
region. Plaintiffs also challenged the general composition of the Commission.
Plaintiffs initially filed a request for a preliminary injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission from collecting certain over-order obligations
from these processors, but the district court denied this motion in August
1997. The case was then briefed by both sides and argued before the court
on April 1, 1998.
U.S. District
Court Judge Patti B. Saris on November 2, 1998 ruled in favor of the Northeast
Dairy Compact Commission. In its ruling, the court denied the challenges
brought by the processors and granted the motion for summary judgment filed
by the Compact Commission.
The court denied
the processors' challenge that the Commission lacked the authority to regulate
Class I (fluid) milk produced, processed and packaged outside of New England
but distributed within New England. Judge Saris said Congress' consent
to the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact gave the Commission the authority
to promulgate provisions governing the pricing and pooling of partially
regulated plants (milk plants not located in the regulated area but having
fluid milk sales within such an area or receipts from farmers located in
such an area).
The court also
denied a challenge by the processors that the Commission did not have the
authority to charge a 3.2 cent administrative assessment per hundred pounds
of milk on fluid milk handlers regardless of the source of the milk they
process, if they distribute their milk in New England. To the plaintiffs'
claim that the administrative assessment violates the equal protection
clause of the federal and state constitutions because it should also apply
to the distributions of manufactured milk products, Judge Saris stated,
"This is sour milk." She noted that the Commission has no regulatory authority
over non-Class I distributions. Judge Saris concluded, "…it is rational
for the Commission to assess the costs of administering the over-order
regulation -- an assessment to which Congress consented -- on all those
who distribute Class I milk in the regulated area 'as a cost of doing business
in the market.'"
The plaintiffs
had also charged that the participation in certain Commission activities
by Compact Commission members who were New England producer or processor
representatives violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because
these members had a direct interest in the milk pricing. The court, however,
denied this challenge, stating that individuals from a particular industry
typically serve on administrative bodies with regulatory authority over
that industry. Judge Saris said, "The inclusion of dairy farmers on the
Commission reflects a deliberate judgement by the participating Compact
states -- a judgement approved by Congress -- to account for dairy farmer
expertise within each state delegation." She added that the Commission
also represents diverse interests, including consumers, not solely those
of New England producers and processors.
On appeal to
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court upheld
the district court decision on November 30, 1999. 198 F.3d 1 (1999). On
May 1, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied New York State Dairy
Foods, Inc.'s petition for a writ of certiorari. 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
The Commission
also is party to one lawsuit in its own name. The case, Northeast Dairy
Compact Commission v. The Organic Cow, is an enforcement action brought
by the Commission in Federal District Court in Burlington, VT. The Commission
is seeking to compel The Organic Cow to make its over-order payment obligations
into escrow, pending final resolution of The Organic Cow's request for
an exemption from the price regulation. On March 31, 1998, the Commission
concluded that The Organic Cow's request for an exemption from the price
regulation was not warranted. The Organic Cow appealed the Commission's
ruling to the Federal District Court for the District of Vermont where
it was consolidated with the Commission's enforcement action.
On April 2, 1999,
the court ruled that, although the Commission's regulation of organic milk
was constitutional and did not violate equal protection or due process,
the Commission failed to make clear its reasoning for denying the exemption.
46 F.Supp. 298.The District Court
remanded the case back to the Commission for further proceedings.Upon
reconsideration and further briefing and argument by the parties, the Commission
again denied the exemption on June 6, 2000.The
Organic Cow again appealed to the Federal District Court.Arguments
on the appeal were heard by the court on June 13, 2001 and a decision is
pending.